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Abstract 
 
Violence against women (VAW) is a societal problem and a violation of human rights. It is 
crucial that governments act on the oppression that women face for being women. There has 
been a lack of a coherent legal system across Europe on VAW. The Istanbul Convention was 
created by the Council of Europe and is first in being a supranational framework setting 
legally binding standards to prevent VAW. However, by the end of 2018, there were still 
countries in Europe that had not ratified the Istanbul Convention. The theoretical literature 
suggests that women’s participation in civil society matters for how governments act on 
VAW. This Master’s thesis explores to what extent women’s participation in civil society 
explains countries ratification of the Istanbul Convention. Moreover, it also explores what 
effect the strength of women’s civil society participation has on countries support of 
supranational VAW policy. The applied method is logistic regression analysis which is 
suitable when exploring a dichotomous dependent variable; the ratification or non-ratification 
of the Istanbul Convention. The results show that it is not possible to find a significant effect 
of women’s participation in civil society on the ratification of the Istanbul Convention. 
Additional findings indicate that a higher level of women’s physical security in a country 
increases the probability for ratification of the Istanbul Convention, indicating that countries 
that already have implemented and enforced laws on VAW are more likely to ratify the 
Istanbul Convention. 
 
Keywords: Violence against women, Women’s participation in civil society, Istanbul 
Convention 
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1. Introduction 
 
Violence against women (VAW) is a persistent and pervasive problem that affects women all 
over the world, every day (Weldon 2002, xi). VAW reflects and maintains structural gender 
inequalities (Hester 2004, 1433). Within Europe, VAW remains a violation of human rights. 
One third of women in the European Union (EU) have been exposed to physical and/or sexual 
violence since the age of 15, 50 percent of women experience sexual harassment and one in 
20 is raped (European Parliament 2018). Stalking, sexual violence, physical and 
psychological abuse by an intimate partner, forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and 
forced abortion are deeply traumatizing acts of violence that women face. VAW has effects 
beyond the harm of the immediate victims. Women who have never been victims of violence 
change their behavior to minimize the risk of violence; women avoid to walk home alone 
after dark, being in private spaces with men or draw attention to themselves. Hence, VAW 
prevents women from taking advantage of their rights as citizens in society (Weldon 2002, 
10).  
 
The clear majority of VAW is carried out by men, it is structural violence that is used to 
sustain male power and control. Considering the scattered attempts by public authorities such 
as police, courts and social services to help women who have been victims of violence, the 
societal and structural character of men’s violence becomes even more evident (Council of 
Europe 2018). In the United Nations’ (UN) Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women (UN 1993) it is stated that “violence against women is a manifestation of 
historically unequal power relations between men and women” (Weldon 2002, 13). VAW has 
been on the agenda within the women’s movement since the mid 1970s, and on the 
intergovernmental agenda since the 1990s when governments first started to take measures to 
combat VAW (Weldon 2006b, 59). Still, VAW continues to be an urgent issue (FRA 2014). 
 
Moreover, limited governmental and economic resources are dedicated to the issue of VAW 
in comparison to the magnitude of the problem. Gender equality cannot be achieved if public 
authorities overlook the large-scale gender-based violence that women are victims of (Council 
of Europe 2018). Gender equality is one of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), 
where it is acknowledged that gender inequality continues to hold women back as well as 
deprives women of basic rights and opportunities. In empowering women, progressive legal 
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frameworks are necessary, as well as addressing structural problems such as unfair social 
norms (UN 2018). Hence, it is crucial that governments act on the oppression of women and 
the violation of human rights that VAW constitutes. National and supranational governance 
continue to be of significance for the development of policies and practices regarding VAW 
(Hester 2004, 1432). However, there is great variation in how governments respond to the 
issue of VAW. Even governments in Scandinavian “woman-friendly” welfare states seem to 
do little to address VAW. Policies on VAW in developed countries appear not to follow the 
expected pattern when comparing it to other social policy areas (Weldon 2002, xi).  
 
Regarding practices that aim at combating VAW, the Istanbul Convention is the most 
comprehensive international treaty to date that addresses this problem (European Parliament 
2018). The Istanbul Convention was created by the Council of Europe1, who identified gaps 
in existing legislation in Europe, and a broad set of obligations were included in the Istanbul 
Convention, ranging from legal measures on criminalizing violence to awareness raising and 
data collection (European Parliament 2017, 1). The Istanbul Convention is the first 
supranational framework to set legally binding standards to prevent gender-based violence, 
protect victims and prosecute perpetrators (Simonovic 2014, 602). The Istanbul Convention is 
open for ratification for all countries that are members of the Council of Europe and open for 
accession by other non-member states. However, there is variation in which member states of 
the Council of Europe have ratified the Istanbul Convention. By the end of 2018, there were 
still 14 member states of the Council of Europe that had not ratified the convention2. Eight of 
these countries are members of the EU. Most of the members of the European Parliament 
have expressed their regrets that these countries have failed to consider the Istanbul 
Convention as the best available legal instrument in combating VAW.  
 
1.1 Aim and research questions 
 
Previous research in policy adoption has mainly focused on variables regarding political 
parties, state institutions, the number of women in the labor force and political institutions on 
the national level (Htun and Weldon 2012, 548). Little scholarly attention has been given to 
                                                
1 The Council of Europe is a leading human rights organization that all countries in Europe, except for Belarus 
and Kosovo, are members of.  
2 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Russia, Slovak Republic, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.	
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the cross-national variation in government responses to VAW, where some countries have 
adopted a range of measures to address the issue, while others have done next to nothing 
(Weldon 2002, 3). VAW constitutes a limitation for achieving the goals of a democratic 
government, such as public health, pay equity, economic development and reproduction. 
VAW is an understudied area of public policy; only a handful of studies have sought the 
explanation to variation in government’s response to VAW (Busch 1992; Elman 1996; Heise, 
Raikes, Wats and Zwi 1994; Htun and Weldon 2012; Weldon 2002).  
 
Previous research has shown that women’s civil society participation matters for government 
responsiveness to VAW. So far only domestic policy responsiveness regarding VAW has 
been researched. The aim of this Master’s thesis is to explore to what extent women’s 
participation in civil society matters for countries ratification of policies concerning VAW on 
the supranational level. This thesis will add to previous research by researching if women’s 
civil society participation matters in the ratification of VAW policy on the supranational level. 
With the increasing globalization and existence of transnational actors and NGOs, it is 
interesting to evaluate if participation in civil society can have effects on the supranational 
level. The Istanbul Convention is the first convention to set legally binding measures that 
solely focus on combating VAW. Previous conventions such as the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) have been criticized 
for omitting VAW. Hence, the Istanbul Convention provides a unique opportunity to assess 
the effect of women’s civil society participation on supranational VAW policies.  
 
In a bigger perspective, this study will contribute to the research on what makes states ratify 
conventions that concern women’s human rights. Regarding VAW, it continues to be a very 
relevant policy area and has been described as a global problem and violation of human rights 
(FRA 2014). Europe is known as a progressive region, also when it comes to gender equality, 
which is why Europe is an interesting region to investigate. It is puzzling to find that a wide 
range of different countries in Europe have failed to protect women’s human rights by not 
ratifying the Istanbul Convention. Hence, the research questions of this Master’s thesis are:  
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1. What effect does the strength of women’s civil society have on countries’ support of 
supranational VAW policy? 
 
2.  To what extent does the strength of women’s civil society participation explain 
countries’ ratification of the Istanbul Convention? 
 
1.2 Disposition 
 
The following section starts with a thorough description of the Istanbul Convention and the 
Council of Europe. The thesis then reviews the literature on civil society, women’s 
participation in civil society and the development of VAW as a political issue. It will also 
feature a literature review of other important concepts that are contributing factors for the 
ratification of the Istanbul Convention, such as women’s political leadership, liberal 
democracy, and gender equality. At the end of this section, the theoretical framework and 
hypothesis are presented. In the third part, the methodology is introduced, including a 
discussion of operationalization, data, method, and diagnostics. The following section features 
the results where the regression analyses are presented, and a discussion follows. Lastly, the 
conclusion answers the research questions and provides suggestions for future research.  
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2. Literature review and theoretical framework 
 
2.1 The Istanbul Convention 
 
The Istanbul Convention was created by the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe is one 
of the leading human rights organizations in Europe. All countries in Europe, except for 
Belarus and Kosovo, are members of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe has 
undertaken initiatives to protect women from violence, and has, among other things, run a 
Europe-wide campaign to combat VAW, including domestic violence. This campaign 
revealed the extent of the variation in national responses to VAW and domestic violence 
within Europe. National reports, surveys as well as studies have shown the magnitude of 
VAW in Europe. It became evident that there was a need for harmonized legal standards to be 
able to protect victims, no matter where in Europe gender-based violence took place. An 
expert group was put together to draft a convention in this field (Council of Europe 2018). 
 
The Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, 
hereafter referred to as the Istanbul Convention, was adopted by the Council of Europe 
Committee of Ministers on 7 April 2011. In May 2011, it was opened for signature on the 
121st Session of the Committee of Ministers in Istanbul. The Istanbul Convention entered into 
force on 1 August 2014. States that ratify the Istanbul Convention are legally bound to the 
provisions when the convention enters into force (Council of Europe 2018). The Istanbul 
Convention is open for ratification for all member states of the Council of Europe, and open 
for accession for other states. However, no states outside the Council of Europe have ratified 
it (Council of Europe 2019). 
 
The Istanbul Convention emerged from the work of the Council of Europe to monitor 
violence against girls and women. Gaps in existing legislation were identified, and a broad set 
of obligations were included in the convention, ranging from legal measures on criminalizing 
violence to awareness raising and data collection (European Parliament 2017, 1). VAW is 
explicitly understood as a violation of human rights in the Istanbul Convention. Gender-based 
violence is defined as “violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or 
that affects women disproportionately” (Simonovic 2014, 602, Council of Europe 2018). It is 
an obligation for the state to address and prevent VAW, protect victims and prosecute 
perpetrators, and failure of doing so is the responsibility of the state (Council of Europe 
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2018). The Istanbul Convention is its first in being an instrument to set legally binding 
standards regarding preventing gender-based violence, protecting victims and prosecuting 
perpetrators. Prior to 2014, there was no supranational comprehensive European framework 
that formulated standards in prevention, protection, prosecution, and services for victims of 
violence. The Istanbul Convention provides such a framework (Simonovic 2014, 602), which 
is a major development for VAW that was welcomed by international human rights law 
(Peroni 2016, 50). 
 
2.2 Literature review 
 
2.2.1 Civil society 
Civil society is a form of activity, rather than an institution or location. It is a type of social 
organization, operating through the coordination of activity and discussion, and it stands in 
contrast to large-scale systems of other forms of social organization such as bureaucratic 
institutions or markets that are driven by profit (Weldon 2006a, 2-3). The definition of civil 
society has been contested, showing the complexity in classifying it (Torsello 2012, 178). 
Civil society can be defined in different ways, and it has been debated which types of 
organizations that should be included in the term civil society, where not all civil society 
organizations are concerned with influencing political decisions (Howard 2002; Howard 
2011). However, within civil society, people can influence politics and raise awareness for 
different issues. In comparison to economic institutions, companies or global communication 
networks, which do not have as their main aim to influence states’ policies, civil society 
institutions are much more relevant as political actors. In broad terms, civil society can be 
defined as "society minus the state" (Shaw 1994, 647). Civil society should be seen as a way 
for groups in society to represent themselves, both in relation to society and the state (ibid). 
This is a view that comes from Gramsci's notion that "between the economic structure and the 
state with its legislation and its coercion stands civil society" (Gramsci 1995, 167). Moreover, 
studies show that the definition of civil society organization is rather equal across Europe 
(Howard 2002; Torsello 2012). The increasing agency of civil society to be able to influence 
political decisions on the same right as states and international organizations has led to a 
"democratization of international law" (Anderson 2000, 92).  
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2.2.2 Women’s participation in civil society 
Women have been organizing to combat the systematic inequalities they face as women since 
the beginning of the 1800s. Women’s activism to challenge structural inequalities has led to 
enormous changes in societies all over the world. The women’s movement is one of the most 
successful and enduring social movements in the modern era (Ferree & Mueller 2004, 576). 
Women’s participation in civil society has been and still is important in influencing political 
decisions to combat gender inequality. Feminist civil society refers to “those voluntary 
associational activities aimed at undermining male domination and promoting the 
empowerment or status of women (or some sub-group of women)” (Weldon 2006a, 3). The 
number of women’s international nongovernmental organizations (WINGOS) has grown 
exponentially since the 1970s (Paxton, Hughes and Green 2006, 900). Substantial research 
has been done on how civil society and international NGOs invoke new norms to pressure 
governments to translate them into policy and law (for example see Dona 2018, Htun and 
Weldon 2012, Shawki 2011). This has resulted in expanded knowledge of how civil society 
and activism affect national and global policy processes, also concerning issues that women’s 
movements push for (Shawki 2011, 176).  
 
Laurel Weldon (2006a) proposes that women organizing with the purpose of furthering their 
own empowerment is a counter-public, where women develop counter discourses regarding 
their oppression, which can affect the male-dominated, as well as, raced and classed, public 
sphere in which it is embedded. The development of a feminist civil society opens up for the 
possibility to make policy processes more inclusive of women’s voices. It becomes more 
inclusive by constituting a forum for the development of women’s voices and perspectives, 
and by introducing them to a broader public sphere. This development of a feminist civil 
society also enriches politics, both feminist and democratic, and should advance state 
responsiveness to women’s concerns (Weldon 2006a, 2).  
 
2.2.3 The development of VAW as a political issue 
From the mid to late 1970s, there has been an increasing focus on women’s rights as human 
rights within women’s movements (Shawki 2011, 175). One of the areas that have been in 
focus for the international community within women human rights has been VAW, and the 
prevention of it (Shawki 2011, 176). VAW was on the agenda of the women’s movement in 
the mid 1970s, and in the 1990s it also appeared on the intergovernmental agenda and 
governments started to take measures to address VAW (Weldon 2006b, 59). Feminists 
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welcomed this development which visualized the harm that women have experienced 
throughout history, and its roots in female subordination (Goldscheid 2014, 628-629). By the 
end of the 1990s, VAW was made a priority area by many human rights groups. By then, over 
170 governments had signed a declaration against VAW, making it possible for women in 
over 20 countries to seek redress for violation of human rights in the international community 
through the Optional Protocol to CEDAW. In addition to legal and formal rights, considerable 
resources from governmental and intergovernmental institutions had been dedicated to 
combating VAW in both developed as well as in developing countries (Weldon 2006b, 64). In 
the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, the term violence against 
women was defined as any act of gendered violence that resulted in harm to women and 
occurred within the family, the community or that was perpetrated by the state (UN 1993; 
Hester 2004, 1433). The National Committee on Violence Against Women defined VAW as 
“behavior adopted by the man to control his victim which results in physical, sexual and/or 
physiological damage, forced social isolation, or economic deprivation, or behavior which 
leaves a woman living in fear” (Easteal 1994, 86). Moreover, state intervention in the issue of 
VAW has the potential to change direct expressions of structural gender inequality (Elman 
1996, 3). The state has patriarchal aspects, meaning that masculine attributes and abilities are 
the basis of the state; however, the state also holds the potential to protect women from 
violence, which is why feminist movements seek redress through the state (Pateman 1998, 
134; Elman 1996, 14).  
 
Activists have successfully and dramatically increased the awareness of VAW globally, and 
the resources devoted to prevent it (Weldon 2006b, 55). The international community has 
ratified international treaties that aim at the human rights of women, and laws to prevent 
VAW have been developed as well as international institutions that focus on promoting 
women’s human rights (Shawki 2011, 175). VAW has also become an important subject in 
public policy making, globally. With the increased focus on VAW, new international norms 
have taken shape since the beginning of the 1990s, where VAW is defined and understood as 
a violation against human rights. It has become necessary for governments to act on VAW as 
these new more progressive norms have taken shape, which recognize that half of the 
populations’ human rights are violated on a daily basis (Shawki 2011, 176). The strong 
movement on gendered violence had an extensive impact on bringing about these changes 
(Weldon 2006b, 64).  
 
 
 
14 
2.2.4 Women’s movements effect on policy and government responsiveness 
Government responsiveness to VAW is to a large extent determined by the existence of a 
strong and autonomous women’s movement which pressure and reinforce state institutions to 
promote women’s status. The mobilization of women has been identified as a key catalyst to 
policy change regarding VAW (Weldon 2002, 5-4). When examining the development of 
social policy, it seems like governments’ responses to VAW are different than to other social 
policy areas, which are more progressive. Hence, social structures of gender inequality can 
also affect policy processes (Weldon 2002, xi-xii). Women’s movements are necessary to 
articulate VAW as a public problem, not a private affair (Weldon 2002, 61-62). In the 
following section, two examples of what women’s movements have achieved will be 
reviewed.  
 
There are several examples of governmental changes that have been made due to pressure 
from civil society. For example, in Italy, activists took to the streets in the mid 1990s because 
of frustration with the government for not acting on the issue of VAW. Activists created a 
nationwide petition to demand action from the government (Weldon 2002, 1-2). 
One example from a relatively recent time is the #metoo movement, which has resulted in an 
increased debate regarding sexual violence against women and where men have been 
prosecuted for their actions (Adam and Booth 2018). Social movements have responded with 
outrage to how the state treats women who have been victims of violence. Change has been 
demanded, and it has been demanded in similar ways across most countries when it comes to 
VAW. Governments starting to take measures to combat VAW is an example of how social 
movements can demand action on issues that have previously been unrecognized (Weldon 
2002, 2-3). 
 
One of the most comprehensive studies on government response to VAW is Weldon’s (2002) 
comparative study of VAW policy in 36 democratic countries. Weldon argues that the 
variation in responsiveness on the issue of VAW is explained by the level of interaction 
between women’s movements and political institutions. An independent and strong women’s 
movement that has connections in the government that aim to pursue the same goal creates 
insider-outsider partnerships. Such partnerships are catalysts for the development of VAW 
policy. Policy initiatives only result in a comprehensive governmental response when there is 
an effective machinery for women’s policy. Where there is both an autonomous women’s 
movement, as well as effective political institutions, governments’ responses to VAW are 
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stronger (Weldon 2002, 156). In another study by Weldon (2006a), “Democratic 
policymaking on violence against women in the fifty US states”, Weldon finds that political 
and civic organizations and large social movement organizations are crucial for the 
improvement of democratic policy responsiveness. Those kinds of organizations expressly 
seek to promote women’s issues in the mainstream public sphere, by grassroots campaigns, 
lobbying or protest. By doing so, they diffuse feminist perspectives to the public, which, in 
extension, results in the improvement of policy responsiveness on VAW (Weldon 2006a, 
156). Feminist mobilization in civil society has also been shown to matter for policy 
development regarding VAW in another study by Mala Htun and Weldon (Htun and Weldon 
2012). 
 
2.3 Review of alternative explanations 
 
2.3.1 Women’s political leadership 
A possible determinant for governments’ response to VAW is the number of women in 
political office (Heise, Pitanguy and Germain 1994, 45). Women’s political leadership 
constitutes a possibility for women to make changes (Kabeer 2005, 14). Women’s presence in 
power is correlated to some changes in policies regarding women’s rights, for example when 
it comes to preventing and punishing VAW (Htun and Piscopo 2010, 2). Women’s political 
leadership is increasing. However, it does not automatically lead to a substantive activity of 
representation. There is a distinction between substantive and descriptive representation; 
substantive representation refers to the effect that women’s presence in parliament has on 
women’s interests, and descriptive representation refers to the number of women in 
parliament (Wängnerud 2009, 52). The main interest in research on substantive representation 
is to which extent the number of women in parliament affects women’s interest in, for 
example, policies (Wängnerud 2009, 59), which stands in contrast to descriptive 
representation and the recent worldwide trend on quotas (Wängnerud 2009, 54). To make 
changes in policies in favor of women, it takes lobbying, consciousness-raising, 
administrative decisions as well as other political tasks. Even if women perform these tasks, 
female politicians may be unable to get their proposals approved since women face numerous 
obstacles in achieving changes in policies (Htun and Piscopo 2010, 8). However, there is 
evidence that implies that women ministers have performed some policy changes to support 
women’s rights. Some areas are more likely than others to change, and one area that is more 
prone to progressive policy changes is VAW (Htun and Piscopo 2010, 9). Where there has 
 
 
16 
been an increased level of women in parliaments, there has been a different prioritization of 
issues and gender sensitivity in all areas of governing, and changes have been made in 
existing laws as well as the introduction of new legislation (UN Chronicle 2010).  
 
2.3.2 Liberal democracy  
The protection of civil liberties also protects the possibility to engage in civil society, which 
should also affect women’s participation in civil society throughout Europe. The liberal 
aspect of democracy is important for the possibility to engage in civil society. In a liberal 
democracy, individuals should have the right to participate in civil society no matter what 
opinions they choose to express – provided there is no violence. Civil society is an integral 
element in a free and just society. To require people to conform their opinions and actions to 
fit those of the state is a warning sign of a state that enforces an approved uniformity on civil 
society which undermines a healthy democracy (Mulherin and Kennedy 2019, 44). Member 
states of the Council of Europe have different backgrounds, and their level of liberal 
democracy varies. Since this can affect women’s participation in civil society, it is of interest 
to explore if this in extension can affect the ratification of the Istanbul Convention.          
 
2.3.3 Post-communist countries 
Countries in Central and Eastern Europe have undergone a profound change from a form of 
totalitarianism to another type of political, economic and social system. Women’s movements 
were at most minimally active during this transition, due to how gender was perceived in the 
old system. Communist governments were committed to gender equality, where women were 
believed to achieve emancipation under socialism and by being incorporated into the labor 
market (Waylen 1994). However, even when women constituted 50 percent of the labor force 
in Central and Eastern Europe by 1980, women were concentrated in gender segregated, low 
paid and low status jobs. Hence, women gained double oppression by still performing most 
domestic work at home while also performing paid work. Women’s emancipation was a 
process decided from above, which together with the control of political space, hindered the 
development of an autonomous women’s movement. Women’s movements did not have a 
significant role in the deconstruction of the old, communist order, nor did they have much 
impact when new political systems and policies emerged. This is because of the nature of 
previous regimes, were rights had been granted top-down, and women did not have a tradition 
of activism and participating in civil society. They had not struggled to achieve or defend 
their rights. The old and discredited, communist order was associated with feminism and 
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women’s emancipation, making these values feel alien in the new order (Waylen 1994). 
Hence, the association of feminism with the former order and the government’s control over 
civil society resulting in the elimination of political space has limited the growth of women’s 
movements organizing around women’s interests. The democratization of countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe has not led to increased political representation of women, nor in an 
increase of women’s social and economic rights (Waylen 1994). Since gender equality has 
been associated with the old system in Central and Eastern European countries, it can also 
affect why these countries would not ratify the Istanbul Convention, since it could be 
interpreted as a way for the government to achieve gender equality from above.  
 
2.3.4 Gender equality 
VAW is driven by gender inequality and imbalance of power (Michau et al 2015, 1681), and  
the general level of gender equality in a country matters for how governments act on VAW. 
Social norms and attitudes regarding women vary across countries. Certain cultural attitudes 
towards women, such as masochistic attitudes, are associated with higher levels of VAW. 
Such attitudes can also be connected to resistance to policies that refer to VAW (Weldon 
2002, 34). Cultural ideas and values that are deeply embedded in historical events specific for 
each state are potential determinants for policy outcomes (Weldon 2002, 34). Countries, 
where attitudes regarding gender are progressive, are more likely to adopt policies on VAW 
(Htun and Weldon 2012, 549). The general position of women in society could be a possible 
predictor for governments’ response to VAW (Weldon 2002, 47). Therefore, it is important to 
control for the general level of gender equality within a country when investigating the 
ratification of the Istanbul Convention. 
 
2.3.5 Physical security of women 
Another important aspect of gender equality is women’s physical security. Legal systems and 
public policies are key in protecting victims and punishing perpetrators, and together they lay 
the foundation for combating VAW. Most countries have laws and policies against VAW in 
place. However, enforcement and implementation are often insufficient (UN Women b). The 
extent to which a country is implementing its laws on VAW could also affect whether a 
country ratifies the Istanbul Convention or not, since the effort of implementing the 
convention will vary. Therefore, it is plausible to believe that a country that already has an 
extensive legal framework on VAW, which is enforced, is more likely to have ratified the 
Istanbul Convention.  
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2.3.6 EU Member  
There is a long tradition of cooperation between the Council of Europe, which initiated the 
Istanbul Convention, and the EU. They share values such as democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law. The EU is the Council of Europe’s number one institutional partner, both on the 
political and technical level. In the words of Jean-Claude Juncker: “the Council of Europe and 
the EU were products of the same idea, the same spirit and the same ambition. They 
mobilized the energy and commitment of the same founding fathers of Europe” (Council of 
Europe 2018). The promotion of respect for human rights and the rule of law have been made 
together by these two institutions (ibid). Since there is strong cooperation between the 
Council of Europe and the EU, it is likely that countries that are members of the EU are more 
prone to have ratified the Istanbul Convention. 
 
2.3.7 GDP per capita 
The overall level of gender equality within a country and the socio-economic per capita level 
usually go hand in hand (Dollar and Gatti 1999, 2). There is a strong empirical correlation 
between measures of gender equality and per capita income (Dollar and Gatti 1999, 4). 
Societies can move to post-materialistic values only when they have secured materialistic 
values such as food and shelter (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Therefore, I argue that countries 
with a higher GDP per capita are more likely to have ratified the Istanbul Convention. 
 
2.4 Theoretical Framework 
 
VAW is a violation of human rights and it is a significant problem. When reviewing the 
literature, it is found that the development of VAW has made substantial progress since it was 
on the women’s movement’s agenda in the 1970s (Weldon 2006b, 59). However, the issue of 
VAW persists which is why it is important to investigate what factors matter in governments’ 
responses to VAW. The effect of women’s participation in civil society is closely related to 
the interest of this Master’s thesis; to explore if women’s participation in civil society affects 
governments’ responses to VAW. The aim of this Master’s thesis is to explore to what extent 
women’s participation in civil society matters for countries ratification of supranational policy 
concerning VAW. Based on the literature review I theorize that countries’ levels of women 
participating in civil society will be a key factor in explaining the variation in the ratification 
of the Istanbul Convention. The main independent variable of interest is women’s civil 
society participation. There is a lack of research on to what extent women’s civil society 
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participation matters for VAW on the supranational level. There are good reasons to expect 
that women’s civil society participation should have an effect that can travel from the national 
to the supranational level as well. As previous research has shown, women’s participation in 
civil society has been crucial for the development of VAW as a political issue and for how 
governments act on VAW on the national level. Therefore, it is likely to presume that 
countries that have a high level of women participating in civil society are more likely to have 
ratified the Istanbul Convention. In this Master’s thesis, I will test the assumption that higher 
levels of women in civil society affect how governments act on VAW on the supranational 
level. 
 
2.5 Hypothesis 
 
Since women’s participation in civil society has been important for the development of 
governments responsiveness to VAW, the research questions that this Master’s thesis aims to 
answer are;  
 
1. What effect does the strength of women’s civil society have on countries’ support of 
supranational VAW policy? 
 
2. To what extent does the strength of women’s civil society participation explain 
countries’ ratification of the Istanbul Convention?	
 
In doing so, the following hypothesis is tested;  
 
H1: Countries with a high level of women participating in civil society are more likely to 
have ratified the Istanbul Convention. 
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3. Methodological framework and data 
 
The statistical method of logistic regression analysis is the applied method for this Master’s 
thesis. Firstly, the section presents the operationalization of variables. Thereafter, the data and 
method of logistic regression are described, as well as limitations of the chosen method and 
statistical diagnostics. 
 
3.1 Operationalization  
 
3.1.1 Dependent variable – Ratification or non-ratification of Istanbul Convention 
The ratification or non-ratification of the Istanbul Convention is the dependent variable which 
is a binary variable coded as 1 if the country had ratified the Istanbul Convention at the end of 
2018, and 0 if it had not. The end of the year 2018 is the chosen year of analysis since it is the 
most recent year. The time of ratification of the Istanbul Convention varies across countries. 
Turkey was the first country to ratify the Istanbul Convention in 2012. By the end of 2018, 
countries will have had six years to ratify the convention since the opening of the treaty 
(Council of Europe 2018). If a country had not ratified the Istanbul Convention by the end of 
2018, it says something regarding the national priorities of the country (Walby 2004, 6). This 
variable was created for the purpose of this Master’s thesis since no previous research has 
been found that has analyzed the Istanbul Convention in this way.  
 
Moreover, validity is a central concept in the social sciences (Menold, Bluemke and Hubley 
2018, 143). Validity refers to the extent to which a measure reflects the true meaning of the 
concept it concerns (Perron and Gillespie 2015, 35). The foundation for scientific inquiry is 
validity, which makes it possible to interpret and use a measure to test the accuracy of 
theories (Perron and Gillespie 2015, 36). Since the dependent variable in this Master’s thesis 
will be coded as 0 or 1 depending on if the country has ratified the Istanbul Convention or 
not, this variable reflects the true concept that it measures3.  
                                                
3 There are different levels to which extent a country has implemented the convention, where some countries have made reservations to 
certain articles and some have ratified it entirely (Council of Europe 2018). The reservations made are for different reasons, where some 
countries have made reservations due to resistance to combat VAW. That said, even Sweden has made a reservation. The length of prison for 
rape is prescribed to be punished with a longer sentence in the Istanbul Convention than the legal code in Sweden would permit. Hence, 
some reservations reflect differences in legal systems across countries in Europe, which are not relevant for the interest of this Master’s 
thesis. This is also why it would be irrelevant to do a statistical regression on which countries that have ratified the Istanbul Convention 
entirely, or with reservations, since the reservations also reflect differences in political systems. Analyzing such variation would require 
another type of method with a qualitative aspect. In this thesis, I am simply interested in whether a country has ratified the Istanbul 
Convention, or not. 
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3.1.2 Main explanatory variable – Women’s civil society participation 
This variable is operationalized by the women civil society participation index from the 
Varieties of Democracy Dataset (henceforth: V-dem). This variable answers the question “Do 
women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups?” 
(Coppedge et al 2018, 233). Three main areas are included in this variable; if open discussion 
of political issues is included in women’s civil society participation, participation in civil 
society organizations and “representation in the ranks of journalism” (Coppedge et al 2018, 
233). It ranges from low to high (0-1) on an interval scale. In 2011, Turkey had the lowest 
score, 0.45 and France had the highest score, 0.97. Regarding validity, the variable covers 
several important areas of women’s participation in civil society and should, therefore, be a 
good estimate for it. However, a high level of women participating in civil society does not 
necessarily mean that women’s issues are fought for. Even if women have the ability to 
express themselves and form and participate in groups, they can participate for any reason, 
not specifically organize to combat the oppression they face as women. Yet, a high level of 
women participating in civil society should increase the likeliness that women organize to 
combat issues that affect women, such as VAW. A high level of women participating in civil 
society should also reflect the power they have and to what extent they can influence 
governments’ support of supranational measures.   
 
3.1.3 Women’s political leadership 
Women’s political leadership is operationalized by the women political participation index 
from V-dem. The question this variable answers is “Are women descriptively represented in 
formal political positions?” (Coppedge et al 2018, 234). It includes women’s descriptive 
representation in the legislative assembly as well as equal distribution of power. The index is 
created by the average of lower chamber female legislator’s indicators and gendered power 
distribution (ibid). The lower chamber of female legislators measures what percentage of the 
lower chamber of the legislature that is female (Coppedge et al 2018, 138). Power distributed 
by gender measures to what extent political power is distributed according to gender. The 
responses range from 0-4, where 0 is “men have a near monopoly on political power” and 4 is 
“men and women have roughly equal political power” (Coppedge et al 2018, 187). The 
variable women’s political participation is on an interval scale that ranges from low to high 
(0-1). The country with the lowest score in 2011 is Turkey with 0.52. The country with the 
highest score in women’s political participation is Sweden, with the score 0.9999962. 
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Women’s political leadership does not ensure women’s substantive representation beyond 
women’s descriptive representation. However, as described in the literature review regarding 
women’s political leadership, there is evidence that women ministers perform some policy 
changes to support women’s rights (Htun and Piscopo 2010, 9). Since the index includes both 
descriptive representation and power distribution, it should be a good measure of women’s 
political leadership since it takes both those areas into consideration, and should therefore also 
measure what it is intended to measure. 
  
Moreover, changes made due to pressure from civil society means that changes were made 
from below (Anderson 2000, 91). Women’s political leadership constitutes of a top-down 
perspective and counters the bottom-up structure of the main independent variable of interest; 
women’s civil society participation. 
 
3.1.4 Liberal democracy 
The liberal democracy variable is operationalized by the V-dem liberal component index. It 
answers the question “To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?”. It 
stresses the importance of protection of individual and minority rights against the tyranny of 
the state and majority. The liberal perspective sees the quality of democracy by limitation of 
the government, which is achieved by civil liberties that are constitutionally protected, an 
independent judiciary, robust rule of law and limitations in executive power (Coppedge et al 
2018, 45). This variable is on an interval scale that ranges from low to high (0-1) (ibid). 
Azerbaijan had the lowest score in 2011 with 0.20, whereas Denmark had the highest score 
with 0.98. The liberal component index is more narrow than other measures of liberal 
democracy (Coppedge et al 2018), and since it includes important main aspects of liberal 
democracy, it should be in accordance to what extent a country is a liberal democracy. This 
variable is mainly thought to affect the focal relationship, controlling for a spurious 
relationship. A spurious relationship means that the focal relationship is affected, or 
explained, by a third variable (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017, 236). 
 
3.1.5 Post-communist countries 
The variable post-communist countries was created by investigating which countries in the 
Council of Europe are post-communist. The variable was coded as 0 if the country wasn’t a 
former communist state, and 1 if it was (Wikipedia 2019). Despite that every post-communist 
country in Europe has its own unique history, there are certain aspects that are characteristic 
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of post-communist states. Some of these characteristics are a single-party rule, centrally 
planned economy and policies guided by one ideology (Ekiert 2012). As previously discussed 
in the theoretical part, post-communist countries are also characterized by resistance toward 
gender equality implemented from above (Waylen 1994), hence, this variable could both 
affect the strength of women’s civil society as well as ratification of the Istanbul Convention. 
 
3.1.6 Gender equality 
Gender equality refers to many different aspects in both women’s and men’s lives, and a 
measure of it should, therefore, include different areas such as social life, health, labor, and 
power. Gender equality is operationalized by the Gender Inequality Index (GII) from the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Health, empowerment and labor market 
are the three main dimensions in the GII (UNDP). This variable is also on an interval scale 
that ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 means high gender equality whereas 1 is low gender equality. 
The country with the highest score in 2011, meaning low gender equality was Georgia with 
the score 0.42. Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden all had the lowest score of 0.047, 
meaning high gender equality.  
 
There has been criticism that the GII is a non-intuitive functional form and overly 
complicated, including measures that are not compatible (Permanyer 2013, 23). One 
limitation with the GII is that it does not include VAW. Since VAW largely impacts women’s 
lives, it is a weakness that it is not included. However, accurate data on VAW that truly 
reflects reality is difficult to find. The number of unrecorded cases of VAW is usually high, 
even in the EU, where many women do not report the crime they have been a victim of to the 
authorities, making most VAW actions hidden (FRA 2014, 3). This measure of gender 
inequality does not include an immediate measure of attitudes regarding gender equality 
either. However, those attitudes regarding gender should be channeled to some extent through 
the measures that are included in the index. Thus, this variable captures how countries treat 
gender equality more generally, reflecting legal, social and cultural norms (see for example 
Alexander and Welzel 2011), which is what is of interest when controlling for gender 
equality. 
 
3.1.7 Physical security of women  
The level of gender equality regarding women’s physical security in a country needs to be 
controlled for. The physical security situation of women in a given country matters for other 
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legislative measures taken to combat VAW. The physical security of women data from 
WomanStats is used to operationalize this variable. It measures different aspects of women’s 
physical security; law, practice, and data. The original variable from WomanStats goes from 
0-4, where 0 indicates a high level of physical security of women and 4 refers to low levels of 
physical security of women. To enable a more intuitive interpretation of this variable, I have 
reversed it. Hence, in this Master’s thesis, this variable also ranges from 0-4, however, 4 
means a high level of physical security of women, meaning that there are laws against 
domestic violence, rape and marital rape which are enforced and there are no norms against 
reporting such crimes. There are no honor killings or femicides, which is a sex-based hate 
crime defined as the killing of women because they are women, in the country. 0 indicates a 
low level of physical security of women, meaning that there are no, or weak, laws against 
domestic violence and rape, which are sporadically enforced. There are honor killings and /or 
femicides that are either ignored or generally accepted. Moreover, the most recent years that 
had data for this variable were 2014 and 2009 (WomanStats). Since 2009 is the year closest to 
2011, it was chosen as the year of analysis for this variable.  
 
The physical security of women is an ambitious variable that includes most aspects of 
women’s physical security, including both laws, and most importantly the implementation of 
laws and norms regarding crimes. Therefore, this variable measures what it is intended to 
measure, and captures the physical security of women which is one type of gender equality 
that other variables, such as the GII, does not capture. 
 
3.1.8 EU member 
The EU member variable is measured by which countries that were members of the EU by the 
end of 2011 and which countries were not. It is a binary variable coded as 0 or 1 depending on 
if the country were a member of the EU by the end of 2011, or not. 26 of the 42 countries in 
the sample were members of the EU by the end of 2011. Regarding validity, there are 
differences in how engaged member countries are in the EU, which could be an explaining 
factor in why some countries have ratified the Istanbul Convention or not. However, 
measuring to what extent a country is engaged in the EU is difficult, since engagement can 
have very different aspects. If a country wants to become a member of the EU could also be 
an explaining factor, since the EU and the Council of Europe have such a close relationship, 
ratifying the Istanbul Convention becomes a way for a non-EU country to show that it agrees 
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with EU values. Thus, I also consider an alternative specification creating a variable for 
countries that were members of the EU in 2011 or were aspiring members. 
 
3.1.9 GDP per capita  
GDP per capita is a common control variable in regression analysis, and it also appears in 
research on policy adoption in governments’ responses to VAW (Htun and Weldon 2012, 
561). This variable is measured by GDP per capita from V-dem, and it answers the question 
“What is the GDP per capita” (Coppedge et al 2018, 327). GDP per capita refers to the gross 
domestic production on a per capita basis (ibid). The general definition of GDP is the 
aggregated value of goods and services divided by the population in a country. It measures 
how much an economy is developed. Higher GDP per capita implies that the standard of 
living is higher. The country with the lowest GDP per capita in 2011 was Moldova (4829), 
and the country with the highest GDP per capita was Norway, 80623.  
 
3.2 Data 
 
All the data used in this Master’s thesis is collected from Varieties of Democracies (V-dem), 
UNDP, WomanStats or created. The variables collected from the dataset V-dem Country-
Year: V-dem Extended are women civil society participation index, women political 
participation, liberal component index and GDP per capita. Data for the GII was found at 
UNDP (UNDP). The data for the physical security of women was collected from WomanStats 
(WomanStats). The last control variables EU member and post-communist countries were 
created as binary variables. The dependent variable was also created as a binary variable. All 
these variables have been put into a new dataset that only included countries that are members 
of the Council of Europe. The opening of the Istanbul Convention was in 2011, and the first 
country to ratify the convention was Turkey in 2012. Since I am interested in the process 
leading up to ratification, the explaining variables need to be before 2012. Hence, the year of 
analysis is 2011. The only variable which did not have data for 2011 is physical security of 
women, which is measured the year 2009 as written in section 3.1.7. 
 
3.2.1 Sample 
The data used for the regression analysis in this Master’s thesis has been created solely for 
that purpose. A list of the countries that are included in the analysis can be found in appendix 
I. The countries in the sample are the ones who are members of the Council of Europe, which 
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are 47 countries (Council of Europe 2018). Five countries were removed from the sample 
since V-dem did not have data for some of those countries4. Since the sample is already quite 
small, the inclusion of these countries could have been of value to eventually be able to see 
more of a pattern. However, the countries that were removed are mostly micro-states, and 
therefore their absence should not constitute a substantial issue. 
 
It is of interest to discuss why Europe is an interesting region to study, and whether it is 
possible to generalize results to other contexts. Regarding Europe, it is difficult to assess the 
variation of VAW in this region, as the nationwide surveys use different measures that are 
incomparable due to lack of one coherent system of assessing VAW (Kury, Obergfell-Fuchs 
and Woessner 2004). The EU, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women and the Council of Europe are some of the actors that have repeatedly been 
calling for comprehensive and comparable data on VAW in Europe. The European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has made an EU-wide survey on VAW which is the 
first survey of its kind on VAW in the EU (FRA 2014, 167). The study shows that the rate of 
women, who since the age of 15 have experienced violence, varies. The countries with the 
highest rate in the EU are Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands and the countries with the 
lowest scores are Poland, Austria and Hungary, which implies that it is difficult to measure 
VAW due to unrecorded cases and norms of not talking about violence (FRA 2014, 27-33). 
What is known about VAW is that it occurs regardless of class, race or culture. As stated 
before, it is a structural issue. Even in countries like Sweden, known as one of the most 
gender equal countries in the world, the Swedish public agency for crime prevention, 
Brottsförebyggande rådet, estimates that there are 100 rapes happening daily in Sweden (UN 
Women a). Regarding generalizability, Europe is a rather diverse region in terms of countries’ 
wealth, level of democracy, culture, norms and civilizational history. Hence, the possibilities 
to generalize results to other contexts are promising. 
 
3.2.2 Research ethics 
In research, ethics is a very important aspect. When using data that has been collected on an 
individual level, ethics need to be considered as individual information is sensitive. However, 
country-level data is used for this Master’s thesis, and such information is usually not 
considered sensitive and issues concerning ethics should therefore not constitute a problem.  
                                                
4 These countries are Andorra, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City. 
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3.3 Statistical Method 
 
3.3.1 Logistic regression 
Since the dependent variable in this Master’s thesis is dichotomous, logistic regression is the 
method of choice. With logistic regression, the model gives the calculated probability of the 
dependent variable having the value 1, or 0, given the values on the independent variables. 
Hence, the model is estimated by maximum likelihood in logistic regression, rather than by 
least squares (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017, 162). If linear regression would be applied 
when investigating a dichotomous dependent variable, it is likely to have problems with 
heteroscedasticity. Linear regression could also give a value outside 0 and 1. Moreover, it is 
not possible to predict a linear association between X and Y when the dependent variable is 
binary. The natural logarithm of the odds for Y = 1 needs to be used in order to get a linear 
function. A unit change in X in linear regression represents how much the dependent variable 
changes. However, the changes in logistic regression are estimated by changes in the natural 
logarithm of the odds for Y =1 for a one unit change in X (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017, 
163). Stata will be used to perform the analysis. 
 
3.3.2 Strengths and weaknesses 
Interpreting a logistic regression output is not as straightforward as interpreting a regular OLS 
regression output (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017, 189). The coefficient is interpreted as 
how much a unit increases, or decreases, on the variable Y for each one unit change in 
variable X, in OLS regression. However, in logistic regression odds ratios are used to 
interpret the results. Odds ratios are interpreted as 1.000 being equivalent to a coefficient of 0. 
If an odds ratio is greater than 1.000, it means that the effect is positive, and an odds ratio less 
than 1.000 indicates a negative effect (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017, 173). 
 
3.4 Diagnostics 
 
A correctly specified model is mainly a theoretical question. However, there is a way to test 
for model specification in Stata, called the link test. The link test gives us two variables, 
where the variable _hat should be significant and the variable _hatsq should not be significant 
if the model is specified correctly (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017). Even if the model is 
correctly specified, there is a possibility that there could be another significant explanatory 
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variable that predicts the ratification of the Istanbul Convention, which is not tested for with 
link test. Therefore, the goodness of fit (GOF) test is used. The GOF test controls for whether 
0/1 values for the dependent variable match expected 0/1 values, either for a set number of 
groups or the number of covariate patterns in the data (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017, 178). 
If there is a significant value, it means that the model must be rejected, while an insignificant 
value means the model fits reasonably well. This is a sign that good predictors are chosen for 
the model. In addition, theoretical explanations should also be used (Mehmetoglu and 
Jakobsen 2017, 179).  
 
Endogeneity in econometrics refers to the situation when an explanatory variable is correlated 
with the error term. Endogeneity is often related to the problem when an unobserved variable 
is affecting the focal relationship, which can give spurious correlations, making it look like 
there is a significant focal relationship when in fact, there is another variable that is affecting 
the focal relationship. If there is omitted variable bias, meaning a variable that affects the 
focal dependent or independent variable, the problem of a spurious relationship occurs. To 
control for endogeneity by including the control variables, the risk of spurious results 
decreases (Schultz, Tan and Walsh 2010, 145). 
 
Moreover, multicollinearity problems can occur if the independent variables are linear 
functions of other X-variables (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017, 167). When controlling for 
multicollinearity in Stata, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) value should not exceed 5, since 
a higher value means that there might be multicollinearity problems. In order to overcome 
problems with multicollinearity, one should understand what the causes are, and try to solve 
it. Variables that have multicollinearity can be removed or collapsed into an index 
(Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017, 146). Lastly, Pregibon’s (1981) influence statistic dbeta is 
used in order to test for influential cases (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017, 179). The results 
for the diagnostics will be presented in the result section and are in appendix IV. 
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4. Results 
 
Firstly, the process of choosing a model is discussed. Thereafter, the regression analyses and 
interpretations are presented. The result from the diagnostics follows. 
 
Before interpreting the results, the process for deciding on a model is explained. Sample size 
strongly affects statistical power. Since there are only 42 cases in the regression analysis, 
there is a risk that the analysis will not be able to detect significant change of women’s 
participation in civil society on the ratification of the Istanbul Convention if the effect is small 
(Miles and Shevlin 2001). Thus, the number of independent variables included in the model 
must be limited to decrease the limits on statistical power when using a small sample. Ten 
cases per independent variable is a minimum guideline to prevent these computational issues 
(Tabachnik and Fidell 2009). Therefore, I tested for which independent variables were the 
strongest correlates with the dependent variable on the bivariate level. At first, I used the level 
p < 0.05 as a threshold for which variables to include in the model. Then, I used the level p < 
0.1. Since women’s participation in civil society is my main variable of interest, it will be 
included in the models even if it is not significant on the bivariate level. This method shows 
that the variables that are significant p < 0.05 on the bivariate stage are liberal democracy, 
post-communist countries, physical security of women and GII. Since using both psychical 
security of women and GII creates a multicollinearity problem, the variable physical security 
of women will be used since it is more significant than GII. Women’s political leadership and 
GDP per capita are significant on the level p < 0.1. Therefore, there are six different 
regression models, where the first four models include variables that are significant on the p < 
0.05 level at the bivariate stage, and the fifth and sixth model also include the two variables 
that are significant on the level p < 0.1 at the bivariate stage. Regarding controlling for 
statistical issues in these regressions, the diagnostics are performed on both the model 
including the four variables that were significant on the bivariate stage p < 0.05 and the full 
model including six variables. 
 
Moreover, the variable EU member was not significant on the bivariate level. However, it is 
likely to believe that countries that are aspiring members of the EU are more likely to ratify 
the Istanbul Convention in order to show agreement with EU values. Therefore, a variable for 
countries that were members of the EU in 2011 or were aspiring members was created, but 
did not give significant results either and is therefore not included in the model.  
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Governments response to the issues that women’s movements push for can take time (Caul 
1999, 94). There is an expected time lag between new subjects put on the political agenda by 
feminist mobilization and the response by the political system (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 
446). In this analysis, there is a lag for most countries, since the women’s civil society 
participation variable is measured in 2011 and countries ratified after that. Hence, the lag 
differs for each country. It would have been possible to measure the women’s civil society 
participation variable one year before each country ratified the convention. However, it soon 
becomes messy, difficult and arbitrary to interpret the results if different years have been used 
for every country. I therefore acknowledge this timing dilemma as a limitation of this study.  
 
There are two regression analyses, where the first one includes the full sample, and the second 
one excludes two observations, Azerbaijan and North Macedonia, which exerted most 
influence on the results. Hence, there are two regression analyses to evaluate the influence of 
these two observations. Moreover, the regression analyses show odds ratios. Odds ratios 
enable a more substantive interpretation, whereas interpretation of logistic coefficients can 
only tell us about the direction of the effect. If interested, the regression analyses with logistic 
coefficients can be found in Appendix II. Moving on, the results are presented below. 
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4.1 Regression analysis 
 
Table 1. Logistic regression with odds ratios, using the full sample 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Istanbul 
Convention 
Istanbul 
Convention 
Istanbul 
Convention 
Istanbul 
Convention 
Istanbul 
Convention 
Istanbul 
Convention 
       
Women Civil Society 
Participation 
0.680 .000036 .0005432 .0001772 .0000153 .0000114   
 (2.357) (.0002624) (.0039751) (0.0013094) (.0001153) (.0000886  ) 
Liberal  
Democracy  
 1914.878** 233.757 200.4938   21.19593 25.11507 
  (5845.086) (785.350) (701.667) (79.13987) (98.2292) 
Post-communist 
countries 
  0.318 0.6793251 0.6032029 .3241571 
   (0.321) (0.8544179) (0.7765123) (.498936) 
Physical Security of  
Women 
   2.243914 1.971378 2.201538 
    (1.747516) (1.532297) (1.784099) 
Womens Political 
Leadership 
    25692.53 108047.3 
     (245729) (1074367) 
GDP per  
capita  
     .100 
      (0000396) 
Intercept 3.128 37.107 41.301 20.01272 .1023425   858.931 
 (9.573) (187.772) (201.916) (97.90801) (.5828322) (10322.29) 
Observations 42 42 42 41 41 41 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
As seen in the regression tables, it can be difficult to get significant results when using a small 
sample. The only variable that is significant is the liberal democracy variable in the second 
model. This variable has a positive effect, implying that countries that score high on the 
question “to what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?” are more likely to 
ratify the Istanbul Convention. The odds ratio is interpreted as how many percent the odds for 
ratification of the Istanbul Convention increase for a one unit increase in a variable 
(Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017, 173). By interpreting model two (by taking the odds ratio 
1914.878 – 1), it means that the odds for ratification of the Istanbul Convention increases by 
191387 percent if the liberal democracy variable increases one unit. The reason why this 
effect is that great depends on the scale; the liberal democracy variable is on a scale that goes 
from 0 to 1, meaning that a one unit increase goes from the minimum value 0 to the maximum 
value 1. Hence, this shows the effect of going from no liberal democracy to full liberal 
democracy. Moreover, in the following model number three, the liberal democracy variable is 
approaching significance on the level p < 0.1, where it has a p-value of 0.104. The only 
variable that is approaching significance in model four is the liberal democracy variable 
which has a p-value of 0.130. When adding the last two variables in regression five and six 
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none of the independent variables are significant. Moreover, the reason why the number of 
observations changes in the models is because that Montenegro was not included in 
WomanStats physical security of women data, and therefore when introducing this variable 
one observation drops. 
 
Table 2. Logistic regression with odds ratios, excluding Azerbaijan and North Macedonia 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Istanbul 
Convention 
Istanbul 
Convention 
Istanbul 
Convention 
Istanbul 
Convention 
Istanbul 
Convention 
Istanbul 
Convention 
       
Women Civil Society 
Participation 
0.005 1.58e-08 3.17e-07 1.95e-09 2.78e-09 1.08e-09 
 (.029) (1.79e-07) (3.48e-06) (2.45e-08) (3.41e-08) (1.43e-08) 
Liberal  
Democracy  
 4699.613** 436.627 640.493 55.326 99.599 
  (16937.09) (1672.112) (2824.092) (325.758) (618.184) 
Post-communist 
countries 
  0.297 1.361 1.234 .793 
   (.301) (1.795) (1.643) (1.225) 
Physical Security of  
Women 
   5.532* 4.880* 5.359*  
    (5.127) (4.633) (5.288) 
Womens Political 
Leadership 
    954.385 1249.907 
     (11290.89) (14967.4) 
GDP per  
capita  
     .100 
      (.0000414) 
Intercept 266.108 17727.61 20024.69 31431.41 350.5486 858.931 
 (1432.186) (153681.7) (165541.8) (282325.3) (3917.989) (10322.29) 
Observations 40 40 40 39 39 39 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
When removing Azerbaijan and North Macedonia from the sample, some interesting results 
occur. The variable liberal democracy is still significant and has a positive effect in the second 
model, just as in table 1. When adding the post-communist variable in model three, the liberal 
democracy variable has a p-value of 0.112. When the variable physical security of women is 
added in the fourth model, it is significant with a p-value of 0.065, and the liberal democracy 
has a p-value of 0.143. In the fifth model, the physical security of women variable is still 
significant on the level p<0.1 with a p-value of 0.095. In the last model six, the physical 
security of women variable has a p-value of 0.089. The direction of the effect for this variable 
in all models is positive, implying that countries with a high score on physical security of 
women are more likely to ratify the Istanbul Convention. The odds ratio is interpreted as how 
many percent the odds for ratification of the Istanbul Convention increase for a one unit 
increase in a variable (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen 2017, 173). Interpreting model six (by 
taking the odds ratio 5.359 – 1.000), it means that the odds for ratification of the Istanbul 
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Convention increases by 435.9 percent if the physical security of women variable increases 
one unit. The scale for this variable 0 to 4. This implies that a country that has a high score in 
the physical security of women variable, meaning that there is laws against domestic violence, 
rape and marital rape which are enforced, no norms against reporting such crimes and no 
honor killings or femicides (WomanStats), are more likely to ratify the Istanbul Convention. 
The physical security of women variable stays significant throughout the models, implying 
the strength of it. 
 
4.2 Diagnostics 
 
The link test has been performed to test for model specification and the value was 
insignificant, meaning that good predictors have been chosen for the model. The GOF test has 
also been performed to ensure that no other significant explanatory variable predicts the 
ratification of the Istanbul Convention. The test gave an insignificant value, which indicates 
that the model fits reasonably well. Hence, the predictors are good for this model. Moreover, 
multicollinearity has also been tested for using the VIF test. The result shows that no variable 
had a value above 5, indicating that multicollinearity could not be found. The results for the 
tests can be found in appendix IV. 
 
When using Pregibon’s (1981) statistical command dbeta, Azerbaijan and North Macedonia 
were identified as the observations that exerted the most influence on the regression model, 
which can be found in appendix IV, graph 1. Azerbaijan scores very low in comparison to 
other observations on many variables and has not ratified the Istanbul Convention. North 
Macedonia has ratified the Istanbul Convention, but also score low on many of the variables. 
Because of these influential cases, there are two regression analyses in the result section.  
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5. Discussion 
 
In this section the results will be discussed in relation to the research questions;  
 
1. What effect does the strength of women’s civil society have on countries’ support of 
supranational VAW policy? 
 
 2. To what extent does the strength of women’s civil society participation explain countries’ 
ratification of the Istanbul Convention? 
 
Firstly, with regard to the research questions, the results show that it was not possible to find a 
significant effect between the strength of women’s civil society and the ratification of the 
Istanbul Convention. Hence, the strength of women’s civil society has an insignificant effect 
on the ratification of the Istanbul Convention. This indicates that the strength of women´s 
civil society is not affecting VAW policy on the supranational level. The literature review for 
this Master’s thesis suggests that women’s participation in civil society has an effect on 
governments decision on VAW policy on the national level. Since there has been an increase 
in international movements, for example through WINGOS, and globalization, the theoretical 
framework suggested that women’s participation in civil society should also matter for 
ratification of VAW policy on the supranational level. However, as seen in the results, this 
was not the case in this particular setting regarding the Istanbul Convention. Hence, women’s 
movements and organizations are not taking advantage of all pressure points that lie beyond 
the national level, and are not able to make use of policies on the supranational level in this 
case. It is plausible that given the increasingly transnational nature of NGOs, the national 
conditions of civil society might be less relevant for government responsiveness to VAW. The 
national setting may lose some of its importance considering that organizations are 
transnational. This is a plausible explanation to why there was an insignificant result for 
women’s participation in civil society on the national level. However, these transnational 
actors must be situated somewhere, and hence should also to some extent be channeled 
through domestic contexts. Moreover, it is also possible that the insignificant result is a 
product of governments acting in their own interests on the supranational level, which 
women’s organizations in domestic civil society is not able to reach.  
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Secondly, the findings also showed that physical security of women has a positive effect on 
countries’ ratification of the Istanbul Convention, which was according to theoretical 
expectations. It is significant in all the models it is included in, indicating the strength of it. If 
a country already has good laws in place for women and these are well implemented and 
enforced, the country is more likely to ratify the Istanbul Convention. It becomes less of an 
effort to implement the Istanbul Convention if the prerequisites already are in place. Possibly, 
such a country is likely to already promote women’s human rights and have national policies 
for VAW in place, since a high score on the physical security of women variable indicates 
that there are no norms against reporting crimes and that the laws on domestic violence and 
rape are enforced. This means that women living in countries where there are no or weak laws 
against domestic violence and rape, and where honor killings and/or femicides are ignored or 
generally accepted, are also less likely to gain justice through the Istanbul Convention. For 
women in these countries, it could be that the most effective way to promote women’s human 
rights is by starting at the national level, gaining national laws on VAW, and making sure 
they are enforced. Such a procedure does not happen overnight, rather, it is a process of 
development. Women’s rights are fragile, and cannot be taken for granted, which is why 
living in a society with high physical security of women, needs to be fought for every day too. 
 
Thirdly, the variable liberal democracy was also significant in the second model in both table 
one and two and had a big impact on the ratification of the Istanbul Convention. However, 
when including other variables, it lost its significance. Pondering this result, it could indicate 
that liberal democracy stresses the importance of protection of civil rights, including women’s 
rights, which could be an explanation to why this variable was significant in model two, and 
why it had a positive effect on ratification of the Istanbul Convention. However, since this 
variable becomes insignificant when including other variables one should not put too much 
weight on this result. Rather, it seems like some other variable is explaining the ratification of 
the Istanbul Convention rather than liberal democracy. 
 
Fourthly, by using data for 42 countries, the empirical findings reveal that it is difficult to get 
significant results when using a small sample. The number of countries decreases to 41 in the 
last three models in table one because of missing value for Montenegro in the physical 
security of women variable. In the second table, which excludes both Azerbaijan and North 
Macedonia, it even decreases to 39 in the last three models. It is possible that there was too 
little variation in the data to be able to see a pattern and get significant results. If it had been 
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possible to include more observations in the regression analysis, there could have been more 
variation and thus a possibility to see other relationships and maybe even more significance. 
However, since there are no countries outside the sample that have ratified the Istanbul 
Convention to this date, it was not a possibility to perform such analysis. When extracting 
data for the main explanatory variable of interest, it was sometimes surprising that certain 
countries scored quite high in the women’s civil society participation variable. Part of the 
problem is a lack of data on women’s movements. In order to find more variation, I also 
looked for other measures of women´s participation in civil society. Most importantly the data 
from Htun and Weldon (2012) measuring the strength of women’s movements, which is more 
specific than the women’s participation in civil society data from V-dem, and thus could have 
given more variation. However, the coverage of countries across Europe was not enough, only 
about half of the sample was represented, which was too few observations to perform the 
regression analyses with regard to the limitation on statistical power.    
 
Fifthly, VAW continues to be an urgent issue, which is part of why it is a relevant policy area 
(FRA 2014). Since the women’s civil society participation, which has driven women’s 
concerns historically, fails to affect countries’ ratification of the Istanbul Convention, and in 
doing so also fails to take advantage of supranational VAW policy, it becomes increasingly 
important for governments to act on VAW. National and supranational governance is of 
importance for the practices and policies concerning VAW. The countries that already have 
low physical security of women are less likely to ratify the Istanbul Convention. By not 
ratifying the Istanbul Convention, women in countries with low physical security are left 
behind. Failing to protect women’s human rights is the responsibility of those states. 
 
Lastly, concerning generalization to other contexts, Europe is a region with vast variation 
between countries in many ways. It could be that the results in this Master’s thesis could be 
applied to other contexts as well. However, the relevance of women’s civil society 
participation on supranational VAW policy is of interest to explore in other contexts too. If 
the same results occur, it seems like the general trend is that the national context of civil 
society loses importance on the supranational level. Conceivably, women’s civil society has 
gone beyond the national borders and hence, it could be more relevant to measure and 
evaluate the effect of a transnational women’s civil society, or the presence of international 
women’s organizations in a country. Moreover, this result could affect policy implications for 
the Council of Europe. By connecting the convention to women’s organizations, making them 
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aware of the Istanbul Convention, the Council of Europe could create pressure points from 
below on governments to ratify the convention. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The main findings in this Master’s thesis show that it was not possible to detect a significant 
effect of women’s participation in civil society on the ratification of the Istanbul Convention. 
However, the results show that the odds for ratification of the Istanbul Convention increase by 
435.9 percent when the physical security of women variable increases one unit. This variable 
was still significant when all independent variables were included in model six, indicating the 
strength of it. Moreover, regression analyses also show that it is difficult to get significant 
results. This can be a cause of having a small sample of only 42 observations, where it can be 
difficult to detect a significant change if the effect is small. 
 
This conclusion aims to answer the research question. Hence, in answering the first research 
question, it was not possible to find a significant effect of the strength of women’s civil 
society on countries’ support of supranational VAW policy in this particular setting. 
Regarding the second question, it was not possible to find a significant relationship between 
women’s participation in civil society and the ratification of the Istanbul Convention either. 
Consequently, in this analysis, women’s civil society participation does not explain countries’ 
ratification of the Istanbul Convention. Rather, the strength of the physical security of women 
increases the odds for countries’ ratification of the Istanbul Convention.  
 
This study has contributed to the lack of research on the effect of women’s civil society 
participation on VAW on the supranational level. The assumption that the strength of 
women’s civil society affects how government act on VAW on the supranational level could 
not be verified in this setting. With regards to the hypothesis, I cannot confirm that countries 
with a high level of women participating in civil society are more likely to ratify the Istanbul 
Convention. The result shows that in this specific case, the effect of women’s civil society 
participation could not travel from the national to the supranational level. In the general case, 
it is possible that one could see these trends of the domestic situation of civil society losing 
importance on the supranational level. It is also possible that an explanation to the 
insignificant effect is the increasingly transnational nature of organizations, where the 
domestic context is less relevant.  
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As seen in the results, it can be difficult to find significant results when using a small sample 
in regression analysis. Therefore, regarding future research, qualitative studies on member 
states of the Council of Europe differences in ratification of the Istanbul Convention are of 
interest. When performing a qualitative study, it would also be possible to analyze the 
reservations that countries have made to the Istanbul Convention in a way that is much more 
relevant than analyzing such ratifications using a quantitative method. Moreover, there is a 
possibility to find support for interactions in the theoretical literature between women’s 
participation in civil society and women’s political leadership. Including interaction variables 
require more statistical power, which was already limited due to the small sample size in this 
thesis. Since it was beyond the scope of this Master’s thesis to research interaction effects due 
to not having enough statistical power, it could be a field for future research to dig into. 
Finally, it is of interest to further explore the effect of women’s civil society participation on 
supranational VAW policy in other contexts too. In doing so, I suggest to further investigate 
the effect of transnational women’s organizations on governments’ response to supranational 
VAW policy in relation to the relevance of women’s domestic civil society participation. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I. List of countries 
 
Albania 
Armenia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Belgium 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Georgia 
Germany  
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Montenegro 
Netherlands 
North Macedonia 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Republic of Moldova 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Serbia 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
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Turkey 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom 
 
Appendix II. Logistic regression 
 
This is the logistic regression with coefficients, not odds ratios. The only interpretation that 
can be done from these coefficients is the direction of the effect. With odds ratio, a more 
substantive interpretation is possible. 
 
Table 3. Logistic regression with full sample 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Istanbul 
Convention 
2019 
Istanbul 
Convention 
2019 
Istanbul 
Convention 
2019 
Istanbul 
Convention 
2019 
Istanbul 
Convention 
2019 
Istanbul 
Convention 
2019 
       
Women Civil 
Society 
Participation 
-0.386 -10.23 -7.518 -8.638 -11.09 -11.38 
 (3.466) (7.287) (7.318) (7.390) (7.542) (7.770) 
Liberal  
Democracy  
 7.557** 5.454 5.301 3.054 3.223 
  (3.052) (3.360) (3.500) (3.734) (3.911) 
Post-communist 
countries 
  -1.146 -0.387 -0.506 -1.127 
   (1.009) (1.258) (1.287) (1.539) 
Physical Security 
of Women 
   0.808 0.679 0.789 
    (0.779) (0.777) (0.810) 
Womens Political 
Leadership 
    10.15 11.59 
     (9.564) (9.943) 
GDP per  
capita 
     -0.0000332 
      (0.0000396) 
intercept 1.141 3.614 3.721 2.996 -2.279 -2.405 
 (3.060) (5.060) (4.889) (4.892) (5.695) (6.061) 
Observations 42 42 42 41 41 41 
R2       
Adjusted R2       
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, *** 
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Table 4. Logistic regression excluding Azerbaijan and North Macedonia 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Istanbul 
Convention 
2019 
Istanbul 
Convention 
2019 
Istanbul 
Convention 
2019 
Istanbul 
Convention 
2019 
Istanbul 
Convention 
2019 
Istanbul 
Convention 
2019 
       
Women Civil 
Society 
Participation 
-5.314 -17.97 -14.97 -20.05 -19.70 -20.65 
 (5.974) (11.36) (10.98) (12.55) (12.26) (13.28) 
Liberal 
Democracy 
 8.455** 6.079 6.462 4.013 4.601 
  (3.604) (3.830) (4.409) (5.888) (6.207) 
Post-communist 
countries 
  -1.213 0.308 0.210 -0.232 
   (1.014) (1.319) (1.331) (1.545) 
Physical Security 
of Women 
   1.711* 1.585* 1.679* 
    (0.927) (0.949) (0.987) 
Womens 
Political 
Leadership 
    6.861 7.131 
     (11.83) (11.97) 
GDP per  
capita 
     -0.0000241 
      (0.0000414) 
intercept 5.584 9.783 9.905 10.36 5.859 6.756 
 (5.382) (8.669) (8.267) (8.982) (11.18) (12.02) 
Observations 40 40 40 39 39 39 
R2       
Adjusted R2       
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, *** 
 
 
Appendix III. Descriptive statistics 
 
First, an explanation of the names of the variables used in Stata and what they refer to; 
 
Istcon19 = Ratification of Istanbul Convention 
Wcivsoc11 = Women’s civil society participation 
Libdemcom11 = Liberal democracy 
Postcom = Post-communist countries 
Psec2 = Physical security of women 
Wpolpa11 = Women’s political leadership 
Gdppc11 = GDP per capita 
Gii11 = Gender inequality index 
Eum11 = EU member 
Eumb = EU member or aspiring EU member 
 
 
 
50 
Descriptive statistics 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
    istcon19 |         42    .6904762    .4679011          0          1 
    wcivsoc11 |      42     .876176    .0995169   .4529654   .9728296 
    libdemcom11 | 42    .8341054    .1757482   .1967138   .9831276 
    postcom |         42    .5595238    .4963572          0          1 
    psec2 |             41    1.731707    .8373885          0          3 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
    wpolpa11 |      42    .9379295    .0932803   .6255167   .9999988 
    gdppc11 |        42    27719.24    15884.29       4892      80623 
    gii11 |             42    .1768095    .1018761       .047       .419 
    eum11 |          42    .6190476    .4915074          0          1 
    eumb |            42    .7619048    .4310805          0          1 
 
 
Appendix IV. Diagnostics 
 
Multicollinearity test 
Multicollinearity test for model including women’s civil society participation, liberal 
democracy, post-communist countries and physical security of women. 
 
Variable         VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
postcom          2.58    0.387571 
psec2              2.32    0.430645 
libdemcom11 2.14    0.467352 
wcivsoc11      1.73    0.578027 
-------------+---------------------- 
Mean VIF       2.19 
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Multicollinearity test for model including women’s civil society participation, liberal 
democracy, post-communist countries and physical security of women, women’s political 
leadership and GDP per capita. 
 
Variable            VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
postcom            3.28    0.304663 
libdemcom11   3.10    0.322125 
wpolpa11         3.06    0.326314 
psec2                2.54    0.393363 
gdppc11           2.51    0.398082 
wcivsoc11       1.93    0.516894 
-------------+---------------------- 
Mean VIF |      2.74 
  
Goodness of fit test 
Goodness of fit test for model including women’s civil society participation, liberal 
democracy, post-communist countries and physical security of women. 
 
number of observations =                 41 
number of covariate patterns =         41 
Pearson chi2(36) =                           36.04 
Prob > chi2 =                                   0.4669 
 
Goodness of fit test for model including women’s civil society participation, liberal 
democracy, post-communist countries and physical security of women, womens political 
participation and GDP per capita. 
 
number of observations =                 41 
number of covariate patterns =         41 
Pearson chi2(34) =                           35.23 
Prob > chi2 =                                     0.4096 
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Link test 
 
Link test for model including women’s civil society participation, liberal democracy, post-
communist countries and physical security of women. 
 
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =         41 
                                                            LR chi2(2)           =      13.31 
                                                            Prob > chi2          =     0.0013 
Log likelihood = -18.954594              Pseudo R2           =     0.2599 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    istcon19 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |   .7792671   .3861309     2.02   0.044     .0224644     1.53607 
      _hatsq |   .2723278   .2611902     1.04   0.297    -.2395956    .7842511 
       _cons |  -.2863506   .5113339    -0.56   0.575    -1.288547    .7158455 
 
 
Link test for model including women’s civil society participation, liberal democracy, post-
communist countries and physical security of women, womens political participation and 
GDP per capita. 
 
Logistic regression                 Number of obs  =      41 
                                                LR chi2(2)        =      14.92 
                                                Prob > chi2       =       0.0006 
Log likelihood = -18.151191  Pseudo R2         =     0.2913 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    istcon19 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        _hat |   .9429998   .3317704       2.84   0.004     .2927417    1.593258 
      _hatsq |   .1388374   .1385111     1.00   0.316    -.1326394    .4103142 
       _cons |  -.1996443   .5014549    -0.40   0.691    -1.182478    .7831892 
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Graph 1. Plot of influential cases using Pregibon’s dbeta 
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